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Abstract
This thesis is a theory-testing analysis of the free-market commercial neo-liberal 
welfare-regime  convergence  hypothesis,  stating  that  welfare  regimes  in  a 
globalized  international  economy  will  converge  towards  the  liberal  welfare 
regime. Given the structural settings of the EU context, the cases of Denmark, 
Finland  and  Sweden,  i.e.  the  social-democratic  welfare  regime  within  EU, 
constitute ‘most likely’ cases of the convergence theory. The analysis is divided 
into three legs after dissecting the ‘x’(globalization)-  and ‘y’(welfare regimes)-
variables  of  the  hypothesis.  Firstly,  employing  G.  Esping-Andersen’s 
conceptualization of welfare regimes, I analyze the Lisbon Strategy of 2000 to lay 
down a point of reference which will facilitate further analysis. Secondly, the mid-
term  review  and  re-launch  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy  of  2005  are  analyzed  to 
establish  the  direction  of  development  at  the  regional/regime  level.  Thirdly, 
economic  performances  of  social-democratic  welfare  states  in  relation  to  the 
convergence-theory predictions are analyzed in order to evaluate the precision of 
the convergence theory at the national level.
The analyses manifest important shortcomings with the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy and economic performances in contradiction with the predictions 
of the convergence hypothesis. This leads me to conclude that the convergence 
theory, in present-day EU, has been falsified.
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1 Introduction
In a world with increasingly mobile capital and ever-growing interdependence, a 
vociferous  neo-liberal  camp  predicts  the  convergence  of  welfare-state  regimes 
towards the liberal ditto. Taking aim at the social-democratic welfare regime, neo-
liberal theorists proclaim that the universalistic, egalitarian and market interfering 
features of the former will cause a comparative disadvantage and unsustainable 
costs, in turn, forcing welfare retrenchment and, hence, a shift towards the liberal 
welfare regime.
With this deterministic way of reasoning the convergence of welfare regimes 
is deemed to be unavoidable and even logic, stripping policy makers of alternative 
actions. The structural setting of the international economy simply leaves only one 
desirable way out for the utility-maximizing policy maker. In this fashion, neo-
liberals  are  arguing  in  favor  of  the  ‘economic  logic’,  thus,  depoliticizing  the 
policy area of social policy.
My aim with this essay is to test the neo-liberal hypothesis of welfare-regime 
convergence.  Put  shortly,  the  convergence  hypothesis  states  the  following:  If 
globalization  occurs,  then welfare  regimes  will  converge  towards  the  liberal 
welfare regime.  In order to do this, I will analyze the social-democratic welfare 
regime  in  the  context  of  the  European  Union  (EU),  focusing  on  the  Lisbon 
Strategy and the economic performance of countries within the social democratic 
welfare  regime  in  relation  to  the  difficulties  professed  in  the  convergence 
hypothesis. By conducting a study of the significance and implementation of the 
Lisbon strategy in the light of Esping-Andersen’s models of capitalist welfare, I 
hope  to  be  able  to  establish  whether  or  not  the  EU,  as  of  the  1990’s  a 
predominantly neo-liberal project in terms of economic-political development, is 
causing the social democratic welfare regime to converge with the liberal regime. 
And by analyzing the economic performance of social-democratic welfare states 
within the EU I aim to test the accuracy of the hypothesis even further.
Thus,  the  essay  revolves  around  the  question  of  whether  the  neo-liberal  
hypothesis  of  welfare-regime  convergence  will  be  verified  or  falsified  by  an 
analysis of the development of the social-democratic welfare regime in the EU? 
The analysis is demarcated by the following sub questions: What welfare regime 
dominates the original design of the Lisbon Strategy? What does the mid-term 
review and the 2005 re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy tell us of the implementation 
of  the same and the general  development  of  welfare-state  regimes among EU 
Member  States?  How  have  the  EU  social-democratic  states  performed  
economically during the 2000’s, in relation to the difficulties professed by the  
convergence hypothesis? 
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1.1 Disposition and Methodology
As stated above, the purpose of my essay is to test the authenticity of the neo-
liberal social-policy convergence hypothesis. In so doing, I will turn to ‘the logic 
of falsifiability’ as conceptualized by Karl Popper (Hay 2002:81 ff.; Bjereld et al. 
2002:80-82).  Thus,  the  first  part  of  my  essay  will  circle  around  the  task  of 
dissecting  the  ‘x’(globalization)  -  and  the  ‘y’(the  social  democratic  welfare 
regime) -variable of the convergence hypothesis, in order to clarify what is in fact 
affecting  what  and  how.  In  breaking  down the  ‘y’-variable,  I  will  employ G. 
Esping-Andersen’s  conceptualization  of  capitalist  welfare  regimes,  thus, 
operationalizing  welfare  regimes,  in  turn  facilitating  subsequent  convergence 
analysis. The neo-liberal convergence hypothesis will provide for the dissection of 
the ‘x’-variable, and, thus, the information about what globalization is and how it 
is supposed to affect the social democratic welfare regime. 
Having operationalized the hypothesis, I will turn to the task of empirically 
testing it against the reality of the European context within the EU area. Having in 
mind the neo-liberal character of the development of the EU cooperation as of the 
late 1980’s or early 1990’s, this case study should well constitute a “most likely” 
case,  enhancing  the  importance  of  a  potential  falsification  accordingly.  The 
analysis, or empirical testing, will consist of three legs. First, I will analyze the 
character  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy  in  terms  of  welfare  regimes.  Being  an 
intergovernmental social policy agreement lacking the supranational features of 
the EU’s ‘first pillar’, it reflects the ideas of the involved governments and should 
as such manifest the overall attitude towards social policy in the EU. Therefore I 
will analyze the Lisbon Strategy in terms of Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes, 
to establish a point of reference for later comparison. Second, I will analyze the 
mid-term review  and  re-launch  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy  and  compare  it  to  the 
findings of the previous analysis, to establish the overall direction of social policy 
development at a regional/regime level within the EU area. These two parts of the 
analysis  will  constitute  an  ideological  analysis  of  the  original  Lisbon Strategy 
documents,  through the use of Esping-Andersen’s operationalization of welfare 
regimes. Third, I will complement the second leg with analyses of the economic 
performance of social-democratic welfare states, within the EU area, in relation to 
the problems projected by the neo-liberal convergence theory. 
In conducting the analysis on both a regional/regime level and at a national 
level I hope to cover the statements of the convergence properly,  as it  in itself 
moves  on both a  regional  level  envisioning  the regime  convergence,  and at  a 
national level locating the causes of convergence, which are mainly believed to be 
created by structural conditions in the international economy.
Previous research that I have come across mainly focuses on single countries, 
e.g. Lindbom 2001, or on the regime level alone, e.g. Leibfried 2000, rarely, if 
ever,  acknowledging  the  multi-level  character  of  the  convergence  theory, 
something that I believe lends further importance to my approach of combining 
regional and sub-regional analyses.
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2 Theoretical Framework
In  the  following  chapter  I  will  outline  the  main  theoretical  concepts  of  this 
analysis, namely neo-liberalism and a conceptualization of welfare regimes. The 
outlining of neo-liberalism will serve to present both the general notions and a 
more  detailed  discussion on the  convergence  hypothesis,  whereas  the  welfare-
regime theory will be of a more over-viewing approach serving the purpose of 
facilitating later convergence analysis.
2.1 Welfare Regimes
I will employ G. Esping-Andersen’s conceptualization of welfare state regimes, 
first published in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism in 1990, in structuring 
my analysis  of  social-policy  development  in  the  contemporary  EU.  With  this 
publication Esping-Andersen grew to be a true authority in the field of Western-
society  welfare  states.  His  analysis  centers  on  the  concepts  of 
commodification/de-commodification  and  stratification.  By  commodification 
Esping-Andersen explains the development from self-sufficient individuals in the 
pre-industrialized economy, to market-dependent individuals as labor power was 
made  a  commodity  in  the  industrialized  economy.  With  this  development  the 
possibility  for  individuals  to  survive  outside  the  market  was  circumscribed 
(Esping-Andersen  1990:35).  Thus,  Esping-Andersen  understands  de-
commodification as the development of circumstances where the individual is no 
longer dependent upon the market to sustain a decent living. In relation to state 
welfare, de-commodification is to be understood as occurring “when a service is 
rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without 
reliance on the market.” (Esping-Andersen 1990:22).
Turning  to  the  concept  of  stratification,  Esping-Andersen  points  to  the 
importance of understanding welfare-policy structuring not only as a means of 
state interfering and correcting of inequalities, but as a force in itself capable of 
stratifying and ordering social relations (Esping-Andersen 1990:23). Thus, even if 
“inequalities in living standards decline, it may still be the case that essential class 
or status cleavages persist.” (Esping-Andersen 1990:57).
Stressing  the  importance  of  de-commodification  and  stratification,  Esping-
Andersen  over  several  empirical  studies  identifies  three  different  clusters  of 
welfare regimes, namely the liberal regime, the social-democratic regime and the 
conservative regime, the former two of which will be depicted in greater detail 
below, whilst the latter falls outside of the analysis’ scope and therefore will be 
disregarded.  However  obvious,  an  important  notification  is  the  fact  that  the 
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respective  regimes  are  theoretical  constructions  derived  from,  but  not  fully 
corresponding to, empirical contexts, it is a matter of “regimes, not welfare states 
nor individual social policies” (Esping-Andersen 1999:73; italics in original text). 
For  example,  “[t]he  Scandinavian  countries  may  be  predominantly  social 
democratic, but they are not free of crucial liberal elements.” (Esping-Andersen 
1990:28). Furthermore, I am fully aware of the drawbacks curtailing an analysis 
when applying simplified models to empirical contexts. However, I view the loss 
of  information  and  sometimes  arbitrary  demarcation  between  the  different 
typologies  to  be  weighed  up  by  the  parsimonious  structure  it  allows,  thus 
facilitating greater overview and more stringency in the subsequent analysis. 
2.1.1 The Liberal Regime
The liberal welfare regime1 revolves around the understanding that equality and 
prosperity should be pursued by creating a maximum of free markets and allowing 
only a minimum of state interference (Esping-Andersen 1990:10).  The general 
assumption in shaping liberal welfare can, thus, be said to be that “the market is 
emancipatory,  the  best  possible  shell  for  self-reliance  and  industriousness” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990:42). That is to say that, if not interfered with, the market 
will achieve the optimal resource allocation, rendering work to those willing to 
work, hence, enabling them to secure their own welfare.
In terms of de-commodification,  the liberal  conception of appropriate  state 
welfare  leads  them to  argue  that  a  guaranteed  social  minimum would  further 
unemployment  and  poverty,  rather  than  eliminating  the  same.  Instead,  the 
commodity logic is given supremacy, in that the public is obliged to interfere only 
when markets fail. And when markets do fail, means tested support is supplied in 
a way of “ensuring that non-market income is reserved for those who are unable 
to participate in the market anyhow.” (Esping-Andersen 1990:43). In relation to 
insurances, private and social dittos, are accepted as long as they promote work 
and  strengthen  productivity.  As  an  example,  universally  compulsory 
unemployment insurance is a way of avoiding the problem of disloyal competition 
that would occur if not everybody was insured (Esping-Andersen 1990:43-44).
Focusing on the  free market,  the basic  assumptions  of  liberalism gives  no 
justification  for  altering  the  outcomes  of  the market,  which  are  deemed to  be 
inherently  just  as  they  reflect  individuals’  motivation,  adeptness  and  effort. 
Instead there is a belief that free markets without state interference or monopolies 
will eliminate classes, creating an interlinked web of individuals acting without 
restraint in the markets. The only just form of state intervention is, as mentioned 
above,  targeted  actions  in  relation  to  market  failures,  to  soften  the  impact  of 
externalities on the poor. As an effect, the attitude of poor relief towards social 
policies creates a social stigma in relation to having to benefit from state welfare, 
thus, stratifying the social relations of the society (Esping-Andersen 1990:62-64). 
In short,  the liberal  welfare regime is one promoting “[r]esidualist  systems,  in 
1 The most prominent members of this regime are Great Britain and the United States of America. 
In some contexts the model is referred to as the laissez-faire model.
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which the market tends to prevail at the expense of either social security or civil-
service privilege, or both” (Esping-Andersen 1990:86).
2.1.2 The Social Democratic Regime
The  social-democratic  welfare  regime2 revolves  around  the  principles  of  de-
commodification, universalism and egalitarianism. It is universal in the sense that 
the insurance systems extend to the entire population, though they are graduated 
in accordance with taxed incomes. Furthermore:
 
“It is at once genuinely committed to a full-employment guarantee, and entirely 
dependent on its attainment. On the one side, the right to work has equal status to 
the  right  of  income  protection.  On  the  other  side,  the  enormous  costs  of 
maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic, de-commodifying welfare system means 
that  it  must  minimize  social  problems  and maximize  revenue income.  This  is 
obviously best done with most people working, and the fewest possible living off 
of social transfers.” (Esping-Andersen 1990:28)
In other words, the ambition within the social-democratic regime to reduce market 
dependency through risk coverage and generous benefit levels puts great strains 
on  the  economy  in  times  of  poor  economic  performance  and  high  levels  of 
unemployment.  The  effect  of  unemployment  is  in  this  aspect  twofold.  As 
unemployment  increases,  so  do  the  welfare  expenditures,  an  increase  that  is 
paralleled by decreased tax revenues as increased unemployment equals less labor 
to tax, hence, further accentuating the influence of poor economic performance. 
Thus, in order to avoid the dual effect of unemployment  the social democratic 
regimes contain a policy of full employment through active labor market policies 
aiming at securing that citizens have the proper resources and motivation to work, 
as well as providing opportunities to work (Esping-Andersen 1999:80).
In terms of de-commodification, the social-democratic regime sets out from 
the  socialistic  understanding  of  the  commodification  of  labor  as  a  process  of 
making the formerly self sufficient individual dependent on the market to ensure 
its  survival.  Furthermore,  as  the  worker’s  position  vis  à  vis the  employer  is 
weakened,  commodification  is  seen  as  a  source  of  class  division  creating  an 
obstacle  to  collective  unity.  The  notion  of  class  division  and  collective 
fragmentation  is  further  enhanced  by  the  competition  between  workers  that 
follows from commodification, as commodities by definition do compete. Thus, 
the social-democratic  regime sets  out  to  de-commodify labor  in  an  attempt  to 
weaken the rule of capital.  Clarifying social  democracy’s  position towards the 
individual,  conservatism’s “dependence on family,  morality,  or authority is not 
the  substitute  for  market  dependence;  the  notion  is  rather  that  of  individual 
independence. And, in contrast to liberalism, socialism’s aim is to maximize and 
institutionalize rights.” (Esping-Andersen 1990:47).
2 This regime is constituted mainly by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden and is, hence, often 
referred to as the “Nordic model”.
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The social-democratic regime, in the light of stratification is best understood 
through the above mentioned dedication to universalism. In strife for class unity 
and parliamentary majorities the idea of universalistic solidarity emerged to be the 
guiding  star  in  trying  to  unite  a  “substantially  differentiated  and  segmented 
working  class”  (Esping-Andersen  1990:68).  Thus,  by  capturing  parliamentary 
power the social democrats aim to mobilize the labor movement and its political 
wing in order to exercise political  authority over economic power, to alter  the 
stratifying  outcomes  of  market  capitalism.  Furthermore,  the  concept  of 
universalism equalized the status benefits and responsibilities of citizenship and 
helped build political coalitions (Ibid.). In short, universalism was perceived to be 
a  way of making all  benefit,  parallel  to  making all  feel  obliged to contribute, 
whilst eradicating class differences and obstacles to collective unity.
The summary overview presented in Table 1 below constitutes the framework 
that I will employ in my ideological analysis  of the Lisbon Strategy,  mid-term 
review and re-launch. As such it will, along with above conceptualizations, make 
out my analytical screening instruments, especially in regard of the first two legs 
of the analysis.
Table 1. A summary overview of regime characteristics
Liberal Social Democratic
Role of:
Family Marginal Marginal
Market Central Marginal
State Marginal Central
Welfare state:
Dominant mode Individual Universal
of solidarity
Dominant locus Market State
of solidarity
Degree of de- Minimal Maximal
commodification
Model examples: Great Britain Sweden
Source: Esping-Andersen, 1999
6
2.2 Neo-liberalism
As  the  name  suggests,  neo-liberalism  has  its  roots  in  the  liberal  trajectory. 
Therefore, this part of the theoretical outlining will have its outset in Liberalism, 
to further the understanding of the thence originating theory and its positioning 
towards globalization and welfare.
2.2.1 Liberalism and Free-market Commercial Neo-liberalism
To begin with, the underlying assumption of Liberalism “is the intrinsic value of 
individuals as the primary actors in the international system” (Underhill, in Stubbs 
and  Underhill,  2006:13).  Hence,  the  four  general  assumptions  that  define  the 
liberal trajectory mainly revolve around the individual and his/her rights: 
“First,  all  citizens  are  juridically  equal  and  posses  certain  basic  rights  to 
education, access to a free press, and religious toleration. Second, the legislative 
assembly of the state possesses only the authority invested in it  by the people, 
whose basic rights  it  is not permitted to abuse.  Third,  a key dimension of the 
liberty of the individual is the right to own property including productive forces. 
Fourth, Liberalism contends that the most effective system of economic exchange 
is one that is largely market driven and not one that is subordinate to bureaucratic 
regulation and control either domestically or internationally.” (Dunne, in Baylis 
and Smith, 2005:186)
Furthermore,  the free market is seen as being self regulating,  thus, intervening 
between the self interest of individuals and the public good, to achieve the optimal 
resource  allocation.  That  is  to  say  that  as  long  as  individuals  are  left  to 
themselves,  their  interaction  in  the  marketplace  will  automatically  lead  to  the 
optimal distribution of resources. In this, economics and politics are believed to be 
separate domains with separate sets of laws and dynamics,  and should thus be 
kept apart (Underhill, in Stubbs and Underhill 2006:13).
With a theoretical outset in the above four assumptions, one can easily see this 
paradigm pulling in, at least, two different directions emphasizing the features of 
Liberalism differently; one emphasizing freedom in economic and social spheres, 
thus,  advocating  minimalist  government;  the  other  advocating  strong 
interventionist institutions in order to secure the democratic culture required for 
the above freedoms (Dunne, in Baylis and Smith, 2005:188). Out of the former, 
one can trace the neo-liberal free-market commercial Liberalism that is strongly 
advocated by Western financial institutions and liberal governments.
Free  market  commercial  neo-liberalism  concedes  to  the  neo-realist 
assumptions  of the centrality  of states,  the anarchic  nature of the international 
system  and  the  rationalist  approach  to  scientific  inquiry,  but  emphasizes  the 
possibility to alter structures. Furthermore, free-market commercial neo-liberalism 
“advocates  free trade and free markets  or capitalism as the  way to  peace and 
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prosperity” (Lamy, in Baylis and Smith, 2005:212). In light of this, free-market 
commercial neo-liberalism calls for minimal government interference in national 
or  global  markets.  Moreover,  they  advocate  the  creation  of  institutions  that 
safeguard free markets and discourage states attempting to interfere with market 
forces, as interference is believed to restrict markets and prevent rewarding trades 
from occurring. Taken into the perspective that globalization3 is believed to be a 
positive  force,  free-market  commercial  neo-liberals  argue  that  all  states  will 
benefit from the resource allocation that globalization allows for, mainly through 
the  deconstruction  of  trade  barriers  (Lamy,  in  Baylis  and  Smith,  2005:220; 
Frieden and Lake 2004:10). Thus, the task of the state as a rational actor is “to 
recognize the advantages of the international market as yielding the greatest good 
for the greatest  number,  and to  respond by reducing or eliminating  ‘artificial’ 
political impediments to ‘natural’ patterns of exchange.” (Underhill, in Stubbs and 
Underhill  2006:13).  In  other  words,  government  is  thought  to  be  a  means  of 
creating the necessary foundations for functioning markets.
2.2.2 Neo-liberalism and the Social Democratic Welfare Regime
Derived from the arguing of free-market commercial liberalism, the globalization, 
or  convergence,  thesis  argues  that  the  increased  liberalization  of  markets  has 
decreased governments’ ability to extract high taxes and to provide high levels of 
social  security.  Following the  development  of  globalizing  capital  markets,  the 
international economy has entered into an era of “quicksilver capital”, where cross 
national capital flows are increasingly unhindered. As a consequence, countries 
will have to compete for capital investments, leading to a bidding war where tax 
rates and government welfare expenditure successively will be reduced (Lindbom 
2001:172). As Layna Mosley puts it: 
“Convergence scholars argue that growing trade and financial internationalization 
seriously  impinge  on  government  policy  autonomy.  At  one  extreme,  global 
markets  become  masters  over  governments  and  eviscerate  the  authority  of 
national  states.  Along  these  lines,  many  scholars’  view  international  capital 
mobility as a severe limitation on government policy.  Capital  market openness 
provides  governments  with  greater  access  to  capital,  but  it  also  subjects 
governments to financial market discipline. Governments must sell their policies 
not only to voters but also to international investors.” (Mosley 2000:738)
Governments need capital partly for extracting taxes to finance expenditure, partly 
to sustain possibilities of economic growth through investments. Thus, understood 
in  terms  of  classical  bargaining  in  negotiations,  the  globalization  of  capital 
markets  has  endowed  capital  owners  with  the  possibility  of  making  credible 
threats  of  exit,  thus  strengthening  their  bargaining  position  (Hopmann 
1996:108-9). The way things were before capital markets were globalized, capital 
3 Understood here as the expansion and liberalization of markets and the integration of the world-
economy.
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owners  facing  deteriorating  conditions  could  “wait  and  see,  or  convert  their 
holdings  to  cash,  but  they  [could  not]  move  their  holdings  to  a  different 
investment market. Cross-border investments [were] impossible or, at best, very 
expensive.”  (Mosley  2000:741-742).  But  with  the  possibility  of  international 
capital movements, the prospect of punishing disliked turns of events becomes a 
credible  option,  altering the power relation  between policy makers  and capital 
owners.
With  the  above  in  mind,  the  principle  differences  between  the  social-
democratic  welfare  regime  and the  liberal  welfare  regime  becomes  important. 
Whereas the social democratic regime aims to serve all its citizens according to 
generous benefit standards, the liberal regime provides aid only to those in need in 
accordance  to  needs  tests  letting  the  middle  class  turn  to  private  insurance 
schemes for risk prevention. The difference in scope between the two regimes is 
mirrored in differing levels of expenditure, where the social democratic regime 
has to finance its greater expenses through extracting higher taxes, e.g. on labor 
and  capital.  The  scope  of  the  respective  welfare  regimes  thus  turns  in  to  a 
comparative advantage in favor of the liberal regime, when it comes to attracting 
capital,  as it  offers lower taxes and greater returns. Because of this, globalized 
financial  markets  are  believed  to  punish  social  democratic  welfare  programs 
through tax evasion, rendering extensive welfare programs obsolete. In the same 
fashion, Philip Cerny argues that “currency exchange rates and interest rates are 
increasingly  set  in  globalizing  marketplaces,  and  governments  attempt  to 
manipulate them at their peril. … Globalization has undercut the policy capacity 
of the national state in all but a few areas.” (Cerny, quoted in Mosley 2000:738).
What, then, is the proper role of the state in a context of globalized markets? 
In line with the above outlining of free-market commercial neo-liberalism, Cerny 
argues in favor of the state designing policies to allow domestic firms and sectors 
to become more competitive in the international markets. The state is, thus, to be 
considered an agent serving to commodify the collective in a market-dominated 
playing field. Parallel to this, though, the state still has to provide crucial public 
goods4 and manage specific assets5, even if this has to be done in a context with 
lower  levels  of  maneuverability  than  before  (Cerny,  in  Frieden  and  Lake 
2004:459). Thus, politics and economics are separated to the extent that policy 
makers  are  reduced  to  puppets,  the  surrounding  economic  structure  being  the 
puppet master. The question is, then, how this can be with a theory emphasizing 
the individual and its actual ability to change structures?
Colin  Hay  refers  to  this  conundrum  as  “the  paradoxical  structuralism  of 
rational  choice”  (Hay  2002:103).  The  paradox  lies  in  the  foundational 
suppositions  of  rational  choice,  which  is  indeed  employed  by  free-market 
commercial neo-liberals, and its assumptions about the individual as an egoistic, 
utility  maximizer  behaving  rationally  in  pursuit  of  its  own  preferences.  In 
combination with assumed perfect, or near perfect, information of its surrounding 
4 Public goods are those that are non-divisible in crucial ways and from the use of which people 
cannot easily be excluded.
5 A specific asset is one which is hard to substitute, and which’s substitution would involve high 
transaction costs and/or high economies of scale. Due to problems with free riders specific assets 
are more suitable to produce in an authoritative structure.
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context,  the utility-maximizing individual  ranks its  preferences  in an internally 
hierarchical fashion, e.g. x > z > y  x > y. Thus, in any given context there can 
only  be one  rational  choice  of  action  that  is  consistent  with  a  specific  set  of 
preferences. Consequently,  an analyst  using the rational choice model needs to 
know nothing of the individual, except for its preferences and their ranking, in 
order to predict the outcome of individuals’ behavior. Hence, the paradox lies in 
the mutually exclusive claims of on the one hand the individual’s autonomy and 
freedom to choose as it  pleases,  and on the other  hand restrictions  to the one 
rational option through preference ranking, utility maximization and rationality, 
“[f]or what sense does it make to speak of a rational actor’s  choice in a context 
which is assumed to provide only one rational option?” (Hay 2002:104, italics in 
original).  It  is  in  line  with  this  “paradoxical  structuralism”  that  free-market 
commercial neo-liberals predict economic structures to determine the outcome of 
welfare  policy  and  expenditure  in  the  increasingly  globalized  international 
economy (see Figure 1). Furthermore, this deterministic line of arguing is one of 
the  reasons  why  free-market  commercial  neo-liberals  neglect  policy  makers’ 
possibilities to take action against, rather than in line with, globalization, as the 
prerequisites provided by globalization are seen as providing only one rational 
way of acting.  For example,  because capital  owners can punish policy makers 
through tax evasion, high capital tax levels will be increasingly difficult to sustain. 
Thus, policy makers, in need of revenues through taxes to cover expenditures, are 
seen as being left with the one rational option of adjusting tax levels to competing 
markets’  levels and capital  owners’ preferences. In so doing, the possibility of 
sustaining  high  government-expenditure  levels  and  extensive  state  welfare 
programs  will  diminish  in  proportion  to  the  decreasing  tax  revenues,  thus 
facilitating welfare retrenchment and social-policy convergence.
Summing  up  the  convergence  theory,  what  does  it  have  to  say  on  the 
sustention  of  the  social  democratic  welfare  regime  in  a  globalized  world 
economy? Put shortly,  state interference in markets, be it through extraction of 
taxes, employment legislation or other artificial  impediments to free trade, will 
cause market-equilibrium disruptions and/or comparative disadvantages relative 
to  other  countries  in  the  international  economy.  Because  of  globalized  capital 
markets  presenting  exit  options  to  capital  owners,  evasion  will  cause  poor 
economic  performance  as  investments  decrease  and  unemployment  rises.  As 
unemployment rises, the social-democratic welfare state will experience increased 
expenditures,  further  straining  the  economy,  in  the  longer  run  necessitating 
welfare retrenchment and convergence towards the liberal model. Thus, what the 
convergence theory state, is that, ceteris paribus, state intervention, as above, in 
globalized  markets  will  cause poor  economic  performance  and welfare-regime 
convergence. What characteristics, then, of the social-democratic welfare regime 
are pinpointed as being the cause of convergence? The main contending issue is 
high  levels  of  expenditure  necessitating  high  tax  extraction,  on  capital  in 
particular but also on labor as the labor force becomes increasingly mobile and the 
ability to compete for human capital is made increasingly important. Furthermore, 
the lack of incentives to enter into the labor market when unemployed is another 
source of criticism, caused by market interference. Hence, indicators of economic 
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performance in relation to the above mentioned issues will be of interest in testing 
the accuracy of the free-market commercial neo-liberal convergence theory.
Capital 
market 
participants 
evaluate 
government 
policies
Capital 
market 
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Government 
observes 
market 
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Government 
changes 
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Government 
maintains 
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Figure 1. Causal relationship between international capital markets and 
national government
11
3 The Empirical Context
The aim of this chapter is to authenticate the relevance of a social-policy analysis 
on the intergovernmental level in the EU, even though EU institutions do not have 
legislative competence within the area. Thus, in order to further the understanding 
of the relevance of the EU in a welfare regime analysis, initially a brief historic 
odyssey will be undertaken, after which a presentation and analysis of the Lisbon 
Strategy will be carried out.
3.1 EU, Neo-liberalism and Indirect Welfare-state 
Affection
The EU cooperation  in terms of neo-liberalism is  best  understood through the 
concepts  of  positive  and  negative  integration.  Positive  integration,  to  create 
conditions,  does  in  the  EU  context  equal  initiatives  taken  by  the  European 
Commission  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  constituting  commonly  achieved 
policies, as well as the rulings by the European Court of Justice in interpreting and 
sometimes  extending  the  reach  of  European  law.  Negative  integration  is  the 
means  of  eliminating  impediments,  e.g.  to  trade,  thus  facilitating  further 
integration.  The foremost example of such integration in the EU context is the 
Single European Act of 1986 with its four freedoms of unhindered mobility of 
goods, individuals, services and capital. Through the creation of the Single market 
and  thence  the  deconstruction  of  artificial  barriers  between  national  markets 
within the region, the EU cooperation entered an era of free-market commercial 
neo-liberalism.  Through the  SEA the  EU, as  far  as  economic  integration  was 
concerned, adopted the neo-liberal belief of free trade and free markets as bearers 
of peace and prosperity with the conviction that all concerned countries would 
benefit  from  the  improved  resource  allocation.  Furthermore,  explicit  social 
policies  were  neglected  in  strive  for  increased  employment  through  market 
creation (Jacobsson and Johansson, in Jacobsson et al. 2001:13; van Apeldoorn, in 
Stubbs and Underhill 2006:310; Leibfried 2000:46 ff.).
With the Maastricht treaty of 1992 came an era of so called embedded neo-
liberalism.  Without  employing  a  pure  laissez-faire policy,  the  primacy of  free 
markets  and  freedom  of  capital  movement,  was  to  be  the  driving  force  in 
gradually  restructuring  the  ‘European  model’  with  the  Single  market  in  full 
operation.  Importantly,  though,  the  state,  through  not  going  all  in  with  neo-
liberalism,  was  still  given  the  needed  maneuverability  to  maintain  workforce 
education,  provide  infrastructure,  maintain  social  stability  etc.  Nonetheless, 
“embedded  neo-liberalism  defines  the  social  purpose  of  European  integration 
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primarily  in  terms  of  interests  bound  up  with  transnational  capital,  with  the 
concepts of competitiveness and benchmarking being mobilized to promote a neo-
liberal  restructuring  of  the  European  political  economy.”  (van  Apeldoorn,  in 
Stubbs and Underhill  2006:311).  In  other  words a  wanted development  in  the 
direction of Cerny’s previously mentioned competition state in order to enhance 
the region’s internal sectors and markets in the global competition for footloose 
capital. The restructuring was carried out step by step, in a fashion similar to Jean 
Monnet’s ‘integration by stealth’, referring to demands for ‘market compatibility’, 
thus, social policy regulations on the national level that opposed the unimpeded 
‘free  circulation’  of  labor,  capital,  transport  and  services  were  tried  under 
European law before the ECJ, relativizing national sovereignty in order to prevent 
national welfare payments from being drawn abroad (Leibfried 2000:49). 
Indirectly,  the free markets put pressures on national welfare states through 
allowing  capital  owners  to  play  off  markets  against  each  other  through  more 
credible threats of exit in search for lower taxes and greater payoffs, making it 
more costly to maintain high wages and taxes. Furthermore, the concept of ‘social 
dumping’ was brought onto the agenda in discussions concerning the differing 
levels of welfare expenditure, which were thought to lead to either “a race to the 
bottom […] through heightened regime competition  or a  nationalist,  popularly 
backed  backlash  against  integration  or  a  genuine  breakthrough to  a  European 
social role.” (Ibid.).
In conclusion, the EU cooperation in terms of social policies have revolved 
around labor-market problems needed to be solved to secure the functioning of the 
Single market, e.g. to prohibit social dumping or to secure free mobility. This low 
profile on social policies on a regional level is further accentuated by Art. 129 EC 
stating that actions taken by the Council of Ministers in relation to employment 
policies must not concern harmonization of Member States’ laws, thus, excluding 
one of the pivotal elements of social policies from EU legislation. Nonetheless, 
the Member States have worked their  way around this obstacle in an effort  to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the region through united actions coordinated at 
the regional level, namely the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, to which I now will turn.
3.2 The Lisbon Strategy
In a joint effort to strengthen employment, achieve economic reform and social 
cohesion the European Council in March 2000 agreed upon the Lisbon Strategy. 
To circumvent the above mentioned Art. 129 EC a new approach to joint venture 
was  created.  The  new  approach  is  built  upon  the  concepts  of  soft  law,  peer 
review/-pressure, benchmarking and best practice.
Because  the  Council  of  Ministers  is  not  endowed with  the  competence  to 
legislate  on  social  policy,  following  Art.  129,  a  new,  open  international 
coordination  policy  was  instituted.  This  new  policy  enables  the  Council  of 
Ministers to adopt non-binding guidelines, e.g. on social policy matters, through 
qualified  majority  votes.  With  an outset  in  these guidelines  each country then 
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draws up a national action program to pursue the achievement of the common 
goals. The system thence builds on the concept of ‘soft law’, that is non-binding 
rules and regulations, and ‘voluntarism’, since the implementation of the national 
programs and EU guidelines at least formally is to be considered voluntary and 
therefore is not of a legally binding, supranational character. To make headway on 
the matters  at hand without being able to force non-compliant countries in the 
wanted direction, control- and surveillance mechanisms have been created. The 
aim is to build pressure on the Member States, e.g. through creating opinion in 
pressing issues, in order to make them move. One way of achieving this effect is 
through the use of ‘peer pressure’, i.e. through frequent, organized exchange of 
ideas,  learning  and  through  the  power  of  example,  in  combination  with  strict 
schedules and repeated follow-ups. A second available alternative is through the 
use of ‘benchmarking’, i.e. strategic comparisons between countries in order to 
identify  ‘best  practices’,  out of which recommendations  to  individual  Member 
States are formulated. Benchmarking is mainly carried out by the Commission, 
which identifies,  selects and publishes ‘best practices’ and recommendations to 
individual  states,  thus  rendering  themselves  considerable  opinion-creating  and 
idea power. The third available option is ‘peer review’, through which pressure is 
meant to be built by countries reviewing and commenting on each other’s action 
programs. It is thus apparent that the Lisbon Strategy has been granted means to 
achieve its goals and as such the Lisbon Strategy is best understood as a positive 
integration  project  with  elements  of  negative  integration,  as  will  be  shown, 
especially in relation to the completion of the Single market..  What I now will 
turn to is the question of what goals are to be achieved and how they will position 
the Lisbon Strategy relative  Esping-Andersen’s  welfare  regimes.  That  analysis 
will then provide the basis for testing the convergence theory on the regime level 
in the EU context, through comparison to the 2005 mid-term review and re-launch 
analysis.  In  trying  to  find  the  locus  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy  relative  Esping-
Andersen’s  regimes  I  will  analyze  ‘The Integrated  Guidelines  for Growth and 
Jobs’6 and the Presidency Conclusions from the March 2000 summit of Lisbon.
Being  a  political  summit  with  EU  heads  of  state  and  government,  the 
European Council in Lisbon, March 2000, encompassed a wide range of subjects, 
reflected in the Presidency conclusions. Being interested in the Lisbon Strategy 
solely, I will only work up the first section concerning ‘Employment, economic 
reform and social cohesion’.
 The overall strategic goal as stated in 5§ is “to become the most competitive 
and  dynamic  knowledge-based  economy  in  the  world,  capable  of  sustainable 
economic  growth  with  more  and  better  jobs  and  greater  social  cohesion” 
(Internet3). This statement alone does not pinpoint the Lisbon Strategy relative 
Esping-Andersen’s  regimes,  though  it  gives  some  clues  of  what  is  to  come. 
Clearly, the authors of the document perceive the world economy as increasingly 
competitive, why they are concerned for the competitiveness of the EU Member 
States and thus wishes to strengthen the very same. This line of reasoning bears a 
clear resemblance to Cerny’s ‘competition state’, elaborated in chapter 2, but the 
6 As presented on the Lisbon Strategy webpage, http://www.estrategiadelisboa.pt – Lisbon 
Strategy – Guide Lines.
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means of achieving the overall goals are yet to be presented, why there can be no 
definite  conclusion  yet,  concerning  the  nature  of  the  state  envisioned  by  the 
Strategy’s creators. Therefore, what I will now turn to is to try to locate the means 
and guidelines of the Lisbon Strategy in order to render later conclusions on the 
overall  regime  locus  of  the  Strategy  possible.  This  will  be  done  using  the 
summary of welfare regimes presented in table 1 of chapter 2, focusing on the role 
of the state  contra  the market;  the dominant  mode of solidarity;  the dominant 
locus of solidarity; and the degree of de-commodification.
Beginning with the role of the state contra the role of the market, it is evident 
that as far as the Lisbon Strategy is concerned the major role for governments to 
play is one of enhancing the competitiveness of the region, e.g. through further 
integrating the Single market, stressing the need for further negative integration, 
promoting efficient resource allocation (Internet2 3§) and through contributing to 
a well-functioning EMU (Ibid. 6§). The state does in this way have an important 
role to play, but the role is conditioned by market needs. In this way the state is 
subordinated to the market, through being reduced to maintaining a competitive 
market  on the latter’s  provisos.  The market  on the other hand,  is  projected as 
holding  solutions  to  problems  of  unemployment,  social  exclusion  and 
underdevelopment. Spillover effects from a competitive market, it is said, “will be 
capable of improving citizens’ quality of life and the environment” (Internet3 8§). 
Thence, as far as the roles of states and markets are concerned the Lisbon Strategy 
confesses to the liberal welfare regime.
Concerning  the  dominant  mode  of  solidarity  things  are  a  little  bit  more 
uncertain, as there are individual as well as universal features of the Strategy. The 
dominant mode of solidarity is universal insofar as it aims for full employment, 
reducing illiteracy and exclusion but is individual as it mainly targets the poor, 
that is, those living below the poverty line:
“32. The number of people living below the poverty line and in social exclusion in 
the Union is unacceptable. Steps must be taken to make a decisive impact on the 
eradication of poverty by setting adequate targets to be agreed by the Council by 
the end of the year. The new knowledge-based society offers tremendous potential 
for reducing social exclusion, both by creating the economic conditions for greater 
prosperity through higher levels of growth and employment, and by opening up 
new ways of participating in society. At the same time, it brings a risk of an ever-
widening gap between those who have access to the new knowledge, and those 
who are excluded.  To avoid this  risk and maximize this new potential,  efforts 
must  be  made  to  improve  skills,  promote  wider  access  to  knowledge  and 
opportunity and fight unemployment: the best safeguard against social exclusion 
is a job.” (Internet3 32§)
Thus, even though there are hints of a universalistic approach the emphasis lies 
with poor relief and poverty eradication. As such welfare must be means tested 
and  individualized  in  order  to  separate  qualified  from  disqualified  citizens, 
making the Lisbon Strategy’s dominant mode of solidarity individual and in that 
sense Liberal.
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As I have hinted above, the dominant locus of solidarity lies with the market. 
This  is  made  explicit  in  20§  of  the  Presidency  conclusions:  “Efficient  and 
transparent financial markets foster growth and employment by better allocation 
of capital and reducing its cost. They therefore play an essential role in fuelling 
new ideas, supporting entrepreneurial culture and promoting access to and use of 
new technologies.”  (Internet3).  Taken into the context of the above mentioned 
belief  in  spillover  effects  from  the  transition  to  a  knowledge-based  society, 
efficient markets appear to be the main providers of welfare in terms of the Lisbon 
Strategy.
The importance of markets is further accentuated in relation to the degree of 
de-commodification that the Lisbon Strategy provides for. Because the Strategy 
mainly relies on markets to provide for resource allocation and welfare, the levels 
of de-commodification, if implemented, would be low, not to say minimal. As the 
role of state is centered on the task of strengthening the competitiveness of the 
region and its markets, in order to increase employment and, hence, lower levels 
of  poverty  and  exclusion,  e.g.  through  “making  work  pay  for  job-seekers” 
(Internet3),  the  welfare  provision  on  behalf  of  the  state  in  terms  of  de-
commodification will be minimized. Instead, the individuals’ dependency on the 
market to provide for welfare through allocating resources in terms of jobs and 
wages equal increased or sustained levels of commodification, depending on the 
starting point. Thus, the Lisbon Strategy, in terms of de-commodification, is to be 
considered in  parity with the Liberal  regime.  According to  Esping-Andersen’s 
classification  of  welfare  regimes  the  overall  nature  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy 
corresponds to  the  Liberal  welfare  regime,  albeit  with  some social-democratic 
features. 
In  summing  up,  it  is  evident  that  the  requirements  for  social-policy 
convergence as stipulated by free-market commercial neo-liberalism are fulfilled 
in the European context, making the cases of Denmark, Finland and Sweden as 
parts  of  the  social-democratic  welfare  regime  in  a  neo-liberal  context,  ‘most 
likely’  cases of the neo-liberal  convergence hypothesis. Concerning the Lisbon 
Strategy, it evidently is in accordance with the Liberal welfare regime, why the 
level  of  implementation  will  give  a  good hint  of  the  development  of  welfare 
regimes in the EU at a regional regime level. Thus, what remains to be seen is 
what has actually happened to the social-democratic welfare regime and whether 
or not the economic performance of economies belonging to the social-democratic 
regime can be said to correlate to the convergence hypothesis? Have the granted 
means of implementing the Lisbon Strategy been sufficient or not? What direction 
has the development of the EU in relation to the Lisbon Strategy taken?
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4 The Social Democratic Welfare State 
in a Neo-liberal Context
This  chapter  is  devoted  to  carrying  out  the two final  legs  of  the  convergence 
analysis. First out is the regime-level analysis of the 2005 mid-term review and re-
launch  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy,  to  identify  the  direction  of  welfare  regime 
development  in  the  EU  context.  Subsequently,  a  complementary  analysis  of 
social-democratic  welfare  states’  economic  performance  in  relation  to  the 
convergence hypothesis will be carried out, to estimate the accuracy of the latter 
at the sub-regional level within the EU.
4.1 Development of the Social Democratic Welfare 
Regime in Relation to the Lisbon Strategy
Initially,  the mid-term review and re-launch analysis  will be carried out in the 
same fashion as the above analysis of Presidency conclusions, to lay down the 
overall character of the re-launch and the potential development from the original 
Lisbon Strategy. Then the implementation issues will be analyzed to pinpoint to 
what extent the Strategy has been successful, what parts are lagging behind and 
how this  affects  potential  welfare  regime change.  If the convergence theory is 
correct, the liberal character of the Lisbon Strategy should be preserved in the re-
launch, and more importantly the Liberal features of the Strategy are to have been 
successfully  implemented  by  the  Member  States,  as  necessitated  by  the 
surrounding structural settings.
To begin with, 4§ of the March 2005 Presidency conclusions states that the 
results  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy  are  mixed,  including  progress  as  well  as 
shortcomings  and  obvious  delays.  Because  of  extensive  dismay  with 
contemporary levels of implementation, a re-launch and re-focus on growth and 
employment  was  agreed  on.  Accordingly,  the  follow-up instruments  are  to  be 
refined  and  enhanced  in  order  to  promote  better  and  faster  implementation 
(Internet4 38-41§).
In  relation  to  the  original  Lisbon  Strategy,  the  market  focus  in  terms  of 
welfare provision and state subordination to markets, remain. The matter is still 
one  of  securing  free  circulation  in  and  between  markets  to  further  resource 
allocation,  attract  footloose  capital  and  achieve  growth  and  increased 
employment,  to  decrease  poverty  levels  and  social  exclusion.  Therefore,  the 
individual mode of solidarity, the market as the dominant locus of solidarity and 
the low levels  of  de-commodification,  if  implemented,  are  maintained  as  well 
17
(Internet4  10-37§).  There  are  two  obvious  questions  rising  out  of  these 
circumstances.  Firstly,  how  can  it  be  interpreted  that  the  Member-state 
governments agree on the Lisbon Strategy without implementing it, then evaluates 
the very same and re-launches it on identical foundations? Secondly, what parts 
were left out in implementing the Strategy and what does this tell us about the 
welfare regime development? As I am not trying to uncover the reasons for the 
Lisbon Strategy failure of implementation, but rather focusing on establishing the 
direction  of  welfare  regime  development  per  se in  order  to  evaluate  the 
convergence hypothesis, the first question will be left for others to answer, whilst 
I now will try to answer the latter one.
The  European  Commission’s  communication  document  to  the  European 
Council,  on  recommendations  on  maintained  and improved  implementation  of 
Lisbon  Strategy,  of  February  2005,  circles  in  on  the  following  issues  of 
importance to the convergence theory:
• Completion of the Single market
• State aid reform regarding innovation, R&D and risk capital
• Attracting more people into employment and to modernize social 
protection systems
Concerning  the  Single  market,  remaining  impediments  to  trade  and 
disruptions of the internal free market have been localized and need to be tended 
to. Moreover, the Single market needs to be improved through greater coherence 
and efficiency of existing directives  and the financial  services market  must  be 
consolidated and completed in order to facilitate wider access to capital at lower 
costs. The overall aim is said to be “to implement legislation in such a way that it 
makes the free movement of products and services work more simply and better.” 
(Internet1  2005:7).  The  European  Council  confirms  the  need  for  increased 
negative integration, stating that “the European Union must complete its internal 
market  and  make  its  regulatory  environment  more  business-friendly,  while 
business must in turn develop its sense of social responsibility” (Internet4 20§). 
The continued struggle over the completion of the Single market indicates that the 
neo-liberal  belief  in the superiority of the market as ‘resource allocator’  is not 
fully shared by policy makers amongst the Member States. This is true especially 
in relation to the negative integration concerning the internal service market, to 
which issues of ‘social  tourism’ have been linked making it  a highly disputed 
issue in national debates (Jacobsson and Johansson, in Jacobsson et al. 2001:11, 
13).
Turning  to  the  advised  state-aid  reforms,  the  Commission  emphasizes  the 
centrality of the European and global markets in generating higher growth rates so 
as  to  compete  with  increasingly  powerful  emerging  economies,  and urges  the 
Member  States  to  “prevent  incumbents  from pursuing  restrictive  strategies  to 
protect  themselves  against  more  dynamic  and  innovative  competitors” 
(Internet1:12).  Furthermore,  the  Commission  stresses  the  importance  of 
facilitating access to capital and reducing state aid that constitutes distortions to 
competition and as such impedes necessary structural change, very much in line 
18
with Joseph Schumpeter’s cyclical restructuring of economies through ‘creative 
destruction’(Internet1:13; Fregert and Jonung 2005:254). This is confirmed by the 
European  Council  calling  “on  Member  States  to  continue  working  towards  a 
reduction  in  the  general  levels  of  state  aid,  while  making  allowance  for  any 
market failures.” (Internet4 23§). The displayed discontent with current levels of 
state  aid  and  entrepreneurs’  access  to  capital,  indicates  that  the  wanted 
transformation  of  the  EU  Member  States  towards  ‘competition  states’  is  not 
occurring at wanted pace, if at all. As the very essence of the ‘competition state’ 
lies in competing, e.g. for capital, on the international arena, perceived failures on 
this matter very strongly hints towards failure of developing European states into 
pure  ‘competition  states’.  Thus,  given  the  centrality  of  attracting  capital  as 
expressed in the neo-liberal convergence theory, this is a serious backlash to the 
Lisbon Strategy being  part  of  the  supposed overall  movement  towards  liberal 
welfare regimes.
Turning the attention to the explicit urge for reform in order to attract more 
people  into  employment  and  to  modernize  social  protection  systems,  the 
Commission  suggests  that  “[b]etter  social  protection  systems  will  enable  and 
encourage  people  to  take  advantage  of  labour  market  and  entrepreneurial 
opportunities,  to  extend  their  working  life  and  to  become  less  dependent  on 
benefit” (Internet1:44). These suggestions are shared by the European Council as 
they call for reforms to “make work pay” (Internet4 31, 32§§). This is suggested 
to  be  come  about  through  strengthening  the  conditionality  of  unemployment 
benefits  and  through  enforcing  income  tax  benefits  (Ibid.).The  fact  that  the 
Commission mentions cuts in state welfare expenditure as a means of increasing 
employment, is in itself a very strong indication towards the prevalence of high 
levels  of unemployment  benefits  among the Member States.  Consequently,  the 
fact  that  general  benefit  levels  have  not  converged  towards  the  levels  of  the 
Liberal welfare regime proves that the free-market commercial neo-liberal idea of 
non-intervention in markets is not given supremacy in social-policy making.
In conclusion, the Lisbon Strategy has suffered from poor implementation on 
pivotal  issues crippling welfare  convergence on the regime level.  Through the 
mid-term review and Commission action-program suggestions I have shown clear 
indications on lacks of implementation of the Lisbon Strategy in relation to state 
aid, social policy reform and negative integration. The question that remains is 
what  speaks  in  favor  of  the  Lisbon  Strategy  actually  causing  welfare 
convergence? As far as I can see, the fact that there has been a re-launch and that 
some progress was made during the first five years, is what speaks in favor of 
increased implementation and convergence following the 2005 spring summit. On 
the other hand, as the re-launch is built on the same foundations as the Lisbon 
Strategy of 2000, the political will to implement can, rightfully,  be questioned. 
Thus, what now remains to be seen is how the individual countries of the EU 
social-democratic welfare regime have performed economically in relation to the 
convergence theory.
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4.2 Economic Performance of Social Democratic 
Welfare States within the EU
This last leg of the convergence analysis aims at testing the precision of the neo-
liberal  predictions  at  the  national  level.  That  is,  the  problems  supposedly 
curtailing social-democratic welfare states in a globalized setting that is thought to 
cause welfare regime convergence. Therefore, the subsequent analysis will focus 
on the economic performance of Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and try to answer 
the following questions: 
• Have high levels of welfare expenditure, through necessitating high 
tax levels, caused poor economic performance?
• Has overall high levels of tax extraction caused capital outflows and 
low access to capital on behalf of entrepreneurs?
• Have generous unemployment benefits caused high levels of 
unemployment, specifically long term unemployment?
To answer the above questions I will employ Christian Ketels’7 calculations in 
the  2008  ‘Nordic  Globalization  Barometer’  to  relate  the  performance  of  the 
social-democratic  welfare  states  to  the EU-158 and OECD member  states,  and 
when needed I employ my own calculations of OECD data in the same fashion. 
For Ketels’ calculations the following applies:
Green for a position better than the OECD and EU-15 average, or a 
rank within the global top 10, or an improvement
Yellow for a position between the OECD and EU-15 average, or a 
rank between 10 and 20 globally, or no change
Red for a position below the OECD and EU-15 average, a rank 
lower than 20 globally, or a deterioration
Regarding my calculations the following applies:
Green for better average than EU-15 or improvement
Yellow for equal (+/- 0.05%) average to EU-15 or no (+/- 0.05%) 
change
Red for worse average than EU-15 or deterioration
Concerning the somewhat  arbitrary determinism of the above questions,  of 
course I acknowledge that there might be other causes than e.g. taxation levels as 
regards economic performance. But if no causality can be proved to exist, at least 
the assumption has been adequately falsified.
7 Harvard Business School / Stockholm School of Economics.
8 Referring to the EU Member States prior to the 2004 enlargement.
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Starting out with the matter of high welfare-expenditure levels causing poor 
economic  performance,  the  below  matrixes  show  that  overall  the  social 
democratic  economies  have  high  levels  of  social  spending  and  higher-than-
average taxes, whilst exhibiting top economical performance.  In relation to the 
neo-liberal capital-owner tax-evasion theory, this might be explained by a large 
proportion of the overall tax burden being constituted by wage taxes. As the work 
force tends to be relatively immobile,  higher tax extraction is possible without 
risking  evasion.  Nevertheless,  the  findings  clearly  contradict  the  neo-liberal 
assumption  of  capital  movement  undermining  the  sustainability  of  extensive 
welfare programs. 
Another plausible explanation to this outcome is presented by Layna Mosley. 
After  statistical analyses and interviews with market participants she concludes 
that: 
“Despite financial  globalization,  the motivations for many government policies 
remain  rooted  in  domestic  politics  and  institutions.  […]  Moreover,  evidence 
regarding market participants’ use of the Maastricht criteria suggests that, under 
certain  conditions,  governments  are  quite  capable  of  manipulating  financial 
market behavior.” (Mosley 2000:766)
 In other words, the basic free-market commercial neo-liberal understanding of 
the  ‘structure-VS-agent’  dilemma  appears  to  be  flawed  and  helps  generating 
incorrect predictions as the agent’s capability to alter its surrounding structures is 
neglected  through  applying  rational-choice  models.  Furthermore,  agents’ 
preferences and internal ranking of preferences seems to be at odds with reality as 
market participants in assessing markets care nothing, or very little, of the means 
that governments employ in the pursuit of political achievements, but rather care 
about what promises of achievements are made and how credible these are. That 
is,  government  spending,  expenditure  policies,  labor  market  policies  and  tax 
policies are deemed to be unimportant information in assessing a market prior to 
possible  investments  (Mosley  2000:748,  751).  Anticipating  the  upcoming 
discussion on capital flows and accessibility, what matters to market participants 
is inflation levels and fiscal stability, not the nature of national tax policies.
Social Expenditure
2000 2003
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Social expenditure as % of GDP, in relation to the EU-15 average. Source: Internet5 (OECD,  
2008) 
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Taxation Levels
Overall Wage Corporate
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Share of taxes in GDP in 2006. Source: Ketels, 2008
Prosperity
Level Growth Rel. Growth
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Prosperity is measured by GDP (PPP)/capita; level data 2007, changes 2002-2007. Source:  
Ketels, 2008
Continuing  on  the  already  begun  analysis  concerning  the  second  question  of 
taxation levels and capital flows and access, the below matrixes together with the 
above taxation-level matrix show that the social democratic economies experience 
deteriorating levels of capital outflow, higher-than-average and sustained levels of 
inflow along with high and stable  levels  of  capital  access.  Thus,  overall  high 
levels of tax extraction cannot be said to have hampered entrepreneurial access to 
capital, nor have it caused tax evasion, which as above is likely to be explained by 
low  corporate-tax  levels  and/or  market-participant  preferences  diverging  from 
those prescribed by free market commercial neo-liberals. E.g., rather than taxation 
levels and low labor costs, Colin Hay suggests that “educational attainment/skill 
level  is  the  most  critical  factor  in  determining  the  attractiveness  of  a  labour-
market regime to mobile investors” (Hay 2005:202), as high labor costs can be 
matched by higher skills and productivity.
Outward FDI Stock
Level Growth Rel. Growth
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Level is measured by 2005 world outward FDI share relative to world GDP share, controlling 
for total GDP size. Growth is measured by change in outward FDI share, relative growth is  
measured by the change in of outward FDI share relative to GDP share; 2000-20005. Source:  
Ketels, 2008
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Inward FDI attraction 
Level Change Rel. Change
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Level is measured by 2005 world inward FDI share relative to world GDP share, controlling 
for total GDP size. Growth is measured by change in inward FDI share, relative growth is  
measured by the change in of inward FDI share relative to GDP share; 2000-20005. Source:  
Ketels, 2008
Access to capital
Overall Risk Capital Change
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Overall is measured by the first principal component of a country’s GCR scores on financial  
market sophistication, access to loans, local equity market access, and risk capital availability.  
Level data is for 2007, changes for 2001-2007. Source: Ketels, 2008
Regarding the third question of work incentives through welfare-provision levels 
and unemployment, the below matrixes show that the overall unemployment rates 
among  the  social-democratic  welfare  states  is  lower  than  the  EU-15  average, 
despite of higher benefit entitlements, not including Sweden that exhibit lower 
averages. Looking at the national level though, the picture is somewhat different 
concerning  Sweden  and  Finland.  The  former  country  is  facing  rising 
unemployment  rates whilst Finland is facing the reversed situation.  Looking at 
long-term unemployment  the  picture  is  more  consistent,  with  overall  low and 
decreasing, except for Denmark, levels compared to the EU-15. Looking at long-
term unemployment the effect of extensive social-democratic welfare policies is 
positive,  in  that  it  minimizes  structural  unemployment  and  facilitates  greater 
circulation  of  laborers.  The  picture  of  short-term  unemployment  is  not  as 
coherent, but the overall level and development relative to the EU-15 is positive, 
rejecting any clear causality between high benefit levels and higher-than-average 
unemployment.  Hence,  the  neo-liberal  assumption  that  high  unemployment-
benefit levels will cause higher levels of and longer lasting unemployment, has 
been falsified.
Unemployment
Level Change Rel. Change
Soc. Dem.
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Level is mean value of OECD unemployment rates 2000, 2003-2006. Change is the 
approximated linear tendency of development during 2000, 2003-2006. Relative Change is  
‘Change’ relative to the EU-15. Source: Internet 5 (OECD, 2008)
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Long-term unemployment
Level Change Rel. Change
Soc. Dem.
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Level is mean value of OECD long term unemployment rates (% of total unemployment) 2000, 
2003-2006. Change is the approximated linear tendency of development during 2000, 
2003-2006. Relative Change is ‘Change’ relative to the EU-15. Source: Internet 5 (OECD,  
2008)
Unemployment-benefit levels
2001 2005
Soc. Dem.
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
The OECD summary measure of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates in relation 
to the EU-15. Source: Internet6 ( OECD, 2007) 
24
5 Conclusion
Concluding the above analyses, it is now evident that the free-market commercial 
neo-liberal  welfare-regime  convergence  hypothesis  could  not  predict  the 
development of neither the EU social-democratic welfare states nor the EU social-
democratic  welfare  regime.  Rather  than  showing  signs  of  convergence  in  a 
context fulfilling the structural preconditions of globalization, the implementation, 
or lack thereof, of the Lisbon Strategy exhibits setbacks on pivotal issues such as 
negative integration,  state-aid and welfare-expenditure reform. Thus, to use the 
words of Karl Popper, this swan turned out to be black, apparently confirming the 
negation of the original assumption that globalization will cause welfare-regime 
convergence.
Striving  for  a  model  capable  of  producing  reliable  predictions  free-market 
commercial neo-liberalism simplifies the reality to the extent that the predictions 
have very little, if any, value in analyzing the political economy of social policies 
within the EU. Having said that much, this conclusion does not imply that social-
policy convergence will not happen, only that it has not happened this far in the 
context of the EU cooperation. It may very well be that convergence will occur if 
policy makers deem it necessary, thus, making it a self-fulfilling prophesy. What 
this  analysis  has  shown,  then,  is  that  during  the  investigated  time  period  and 
within the analyzed context, convergence has, as of this yet, not occurred. That is, 
even though the cases of Denmark, Finland and Sweden constitute ‘most likely’ 
cases and as such have severe implications on behalf of the hypothesis’ reliability 
and validity, total refutation is not provided for, as this analysis can only account 
for the analyzed context. Nevertheless, this falsification should have far-stretching 
implications  for  the  reliability  of  predictions  made  employing  free-market 
commercial neo-liberalism in relation to social-policy development.
Furthermore,  what  is  important  to  acknowledge is  the faulty  nature  of  the 
deterministic reasoning that distinguishes the convergence theory and causes the 
entailing ‘de-politicization’ of the social-policy area through stripping agents of 
the ability to choose and affect, and therein I believe one part of the problem with 
free-market commercial neo-liberalism lies. Would the integrated rational-choice 
model be modified to incorporate the real ability to choose, then the structural bias 
would be removed, the predictions would be less deterministic and the division 
between the economic and political spheres would be more evidently redundant as 
the political features of economy per se would become more visible. Moreover, I 
believe the persistency of contemporary structures is underestimated, neglecting 
the inertia often accompanying changes of present institutions and the adapting 
nature of the very same, rendering welfare regimes hard to transform. Therein lies 
another word of caution.  As institutions are hard to transform it might be that 
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change is happening, only not as immediate as Cerny, with his emphasis on the 
pressing need for developing towards the competition state, holds necessary.
Further research should, thus, focus on the significance of the re-launch of the 
Lisbon Strategy and the continued performance of individual social-democratic 
welfare  states,  and  maybe  even  dig  deeper  into  the  individual  state’s  actual 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy to display what has been implemented and 
why.  In that  sense, this analysis  has set the stage, but further analyses of near 
future developments within the EU region are necessary to judge whether or not 
the bumblebee will continue to fly.
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